IDA publishes the following documents to report the results of its work.
PREFACE
This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) under a task entitled "Reserve Component Volunteerism." The objectives of the task are to determine the extent to which Reserve volunteers can support national military strategy, to identify the mission areas where Reserve volunteers can be most effectively employed, to assess the adequacy of legal justification and policy guidance for planning and programming Reserve volunteers for operational missions, and to suggest additional legislative initiatives for policy revisions that may be needed to assure access to Reserve volunteers. To achieve those objectives, IDA consulted published works and official documents and interviewed individuals involved in recent instances in which Reserve volunteers were used to perform operational missions. This document is one of a series of case studies that resulted from that research.
This document was reviewed for accuracy by some of those who were interviewed.
It did not undergo internal IDA review. 
B. BACKGROUND
The United States Army has had an infantry battalion task force stationed in the Sinai Desert since 1982 as part of the MFO Mission. This is not a United Nations operation but is a consequence of the Camp David Accords that brought peace between Egypt and Israel. The United States contributes two military units to the MFO-Sinai operation. One is an infantry battalion that operates (along with infantry battalions from other nations) to keep watch on the boundary between Egypt and Israel. The other U.S. Army element is a multifunctional support battalion stationed at the MFO-Sinai North Camp. The support battalion is provided by the 1st COSCOM, XVIII Airborne Corps, and remains on this assignment permanently with personnel serving for a year [1 and 2] .
The infantry battalion of the MFO-Sinai operation operates in squad-sized elements at dispersed sites (checkpoints, observation posts, and sector control centers) along the boundary between Egypt and Israel. These squads observe movement on both sides of the boundary but are instructed not to take action-particularly combat action-that might disrupt the peace. The rules of engagement are that they are not to fire unless fired upon, and they are armed with small arms and light infantry weapons only. The mission requires a battalion that is well-trained for these special tasks and has noncommissioned officers (NCOs) that operate at a higher level of independence than is normal for infantry soldiers. All of the soldiers of the battalion have to be well-disciplined and thoroughly aware of how to carry out their sensitive duties [2] .
The Army has been accomplishing the MFO-Sinai mission with an AC infantry battalion on a 6-month rotation policy. It takes about 6 months for each battalion to train for the peacekeeping mission, 6 months on the job in the Sinai, and another 6 months for the battalion to retrain for combat missions. Thus, the MFO-Sinai Mission takes three AC infantry battalions-the equivalent of a brigade-out of readiness for major contingencies. The Army is seeking to preserve the stability and readiness of its AC divisions for contingency operations by testing the feasibility of performing this mission with a special infantry battalion task force staffed partially with volunteers from the Reserve Components (RCs).
The use of RC volunteers to fill a specially formed unit for this mission is the idea of General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff. The document establishing the assessment program for the project says: "In order to fulfill U.S. military commitments to peacekeeping during the reduction in military resources, the CSA has directed investigations into alternative/additional missions for the Reserve Component" [3] . This particular battalion is a test of the concept of forming units with AC and RC personnel for some types of operations other than war.
The formation and mission performance of the 4/505th Infantry Battalion will be evaluated by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ART) over a three-year span. The evaluation will include both observations of performance and analysis of data collected on participant attitudes and beliefs. The research is designed to reveal who volunteered, why they volunteered, how they felt about the mission, and the effect of their volunteering on their lives, families, and employment [3] . 1 The plan is for the 4th Battalion of the 505th Infantry Regiment to perform the mission in the Sinai for Rotation 28-January through July 1995. AC Battalions will be assigned to the mission for Rotations 29 and 30, and possibly another composite battalion will be formed for Rotation 31-July through December 1996. A decision on a second composite battalion will be made after the evaluation of the 4/505th Infantry Battalion is completed [1] .
C. THE MFO-SINAI BATTALION
The MFO-Sinai Battalion is a new Active Army unit being formed as a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) unit but using an infantry battalion organization as its structure. The formation of the unit with respect to organization, equipment, and supplies is normal routine. The unique feature of this battalion is that it will be staffed by both AC personnel and ARNG and USAR volunteers serving on temporary tours of active duty (TTAD).
It is possible that initial demographic data may be available in time to influence the IDA report on RC volunteerism.
The Chief of Staffs original concept for the 4/505th was to obtain individual RC volunteers from across the entire United States to emphasize broad participation. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) plan was to obtain all of the National Guard volunteers from a single major organization, the 29th Infantry Division (Light). As it turned out, a degree of broad representation was achieved because the 29th Division provided only half of the volunteers and the National Guard contingent came from 24 states. 2 The NGB viewed this operation from the start as implementation of the existing Operational Integration Program (OIP) of Project Standard Bearer. "OIP plans for the use of ARNG soldiers to volunteer for active duty as individuals or as part of a provisional unit up-to-and-including battalion" [4] . As a result of providing a residual force in Southwest Asia after Operation Desert Storm, NGB had gained experience in using a state or unit as a sponsor to form volunteer organizations. The Chief of Staff's intention to have a nationwide call was not known to NGB action officers until months after the 29th Infantry Division (Light) had already been incorporated into the plan [4] .
The designation of a single major subordinate headquarters to sponsor the operation simplifies both recruiting and personnel administration. The original intent was that the 29th Division itself provide all of the 400 ARNG volunteers-or at least almost all of them. Although this was not possible, the division has been valuable as a central command and control element and sponsor.
The initially planned personnel composition of the 4/505th Battalion Task Force by component is shown in Table 1 . Personnel for the infantry battalion itself come primarily from the ARNG. The US AR provides augmentation personnel with military police, combat engineer, radar operations, medical, administrative, and linguistic skills. When the planning was done, the Battalion Task Force strength in Sinai was limited by treaty to 529 personnel, and in this instance, authorization was given for 5 percent over strength for training to provide some extra personnel to assure that the battalion will be at full strength in the Sinai. The 25 over-strength positions are not identified as such, and the National Guard volunteers do not know which of them are excess [4] . A warrant officer and the over-strength personnel will remain at Fort Bragg as a rear detachment.
The term "rainbow" has been used to describe the original Chief of Staff concept of personnel from many states, perhaps based on the famous National Guard 42nd "Rainbow" Division of World War I that had troops from several states. The term was used during the MFO-Sinai Battalion In-Process Review, 30 June 1994. However, a letter from the NGB commenting on a draft of this paper says that in February 1994 the senior leadership of the Army disapproved of the term "rainbow," and that the NGB does not use the term to describe the Sinai Initiative [4] . Leadership positions, defined as all officers and all enlisted personnel at grade E-5 or above, are distributed among the three components as follows: AC, 50 percent; ARNG, 46 percent; and USAR, 4 percent. All AC personnel will be leaders, and the AC provides the battalion task force commander, operations officer, property book officer, command sergeant major, two company commanders, and two first sergeants. AC personnel with previous MFO experience were sought for assignment to the battalion [2] . The ARNG provides the battalion task force executive officer, supply officer, two company commanders, and two first sergeants. The arrangement is that company commanders from one component will have first sergeants from the other component. The USAR provides the provost marshal and fire support officer.
Initial optimistic assumptions about recruiting of volunteers have not been borne out. In August, it appeared that the 29th Infantry Division would be able to fill all of the National Guard spaces. The initial recruiting drive obtained over 700 volunteers to fill the required 400 positions. By mid-September, however, it became apparent that the National
Guard would have to go beyond the 29th Infantry Division to meet the total volunteer requirement. As of mid-October, the 29th Infantry Division was able to provide only half of the National Guard volunteers, and it has been necessary to accept volunteers from 24
states [5] . While the increased geographic distribution of the volunteers makes it more difficult to establish a family support system, it also brings the Chief of Staffs original vision of a nationwide volunteer unit closer to reality [6] .
The exact composition of the battalion task force has changed during the organization and training process for two reasons. First, the mission itself changed because of the withdrawal of some national forces from the MFO Mission. Second, the battalion commander adjusted his needs after a visit to the intended area of operations. The first set of changes reduced the number of USAR volunteers to 39 as one position (for a linguist) was changed to the Army National Guard, and two positions (for ground surveillance radar personnel) were dropped. At this point, the USAR was responsible to provide volunteers with the skills and grades shown in Table 2 . Additional changes to the list of USAR volunteers are likely as a result of continuing revision of the unit's authorization document.
According to the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), the initial desire was to maximize the use of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel to meet the USAR requirements, and the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) was tasked to fill all of the 42 original USAR positions. At the same time, USARC was asked to be ready to obtain volunteers from USAR troop program units, and in June 1994, responsibility for filling the positions was transferred to USARC [7] . The final fill for the 39 USAR positions was 27 from the IRR and 12 from troop program units.
The Army and the National Guard Bureau are paying detailed attention to the project. An elaborate staff coordination system has been established to oversee the process of forming and training the unit. Much emphasis has been placed on providing full information to the volunteers. A support system to include the volunteers and their families has been established. In-process reviews are held frequently and attract 20-30 interested staff officers, all involved somehow in the process. [7] provides the most recent composition of this list.
D. CRITERIA FOR VOLUNTEERS
The Army Forces Command established detailed criteria for volunteers, a partial list of which includes the following elements:
Volunteers must be qualified in military specialty and weapons.
• IRR volunteers must have been on active duty or a member of a reserve unit within the previous 12 months.
Single parents and members of a dual-parent military family may not volunteer.
• Volunteers must have a current family care plan.
• Officers and senior NCOs must have a SECRET security clearance.
Soldiers with dental braces are not eligible to volunteer.
• Officers passed over for promotion or soldiers with adverse personnel actions pending are not eligible to volunteer.
• Women are not eligible for the infantry battalion but may be assigned to other elements of the task force. If the National Guard is called upon to provide fillers in non-combat skills, women could be assigned to those positions [8] .
Soldiers must be able to complete the tour of active duty at least 30 days prior to mandatory removal date.
E. UNIT FORMATION AND TRAINING
The process of forming and training the unit is designed to promote unit cohesion and capability in a step-by-step manner. The time schedule for formation and training of the 4/505th Battalion Task Force is as shown in Table 3 . The schedule has been followed. The key leaders spent the first 2-3 months getting organized, developing lesson plans, accomplishing supply and administrative actions, and preparing for the arrival of the rest of the troops. The rest of the leadership group arrived six months before the deployment, and the remainder of the unit, 3 months before the deployment. The entire battalion was not formed until October, and the final 90 days prior to the deployment was an intensive period of training for the entire unit. During this process the 4/505th was not subjected to external demands or tasks that interfere with training [8] .
The training program for the 4/505th is in many respects similar to that used for AC battalions on previous rotations for this mission. An AC infantry battalion assigned to the MFO-Sinai mission would start about 6 months ahead of time by "wedging in" some MFOoriented training into its normal training schedule. About 4 months before deploying, the battalion would change its Mission Essential Task List (METL), be excused from most details, and focus on MFO-training. However, the leaders would not go to a special course, and the training would be done within the parent brigade [9] . 
G. COST OF THE PROGRAM
The basic cost elements of the MFO mission are in Table 4 . This is about the same cost that would be incurred by using an AC battalion for the mission. The training costs, base operations, and travel costs might be slightly less for an AC battalion, but since the RC volunteers are not authorized a PCS move for the unaccompanied tour, there are some minor savings. 
H. OBSERVATIONS
Based on information provided at this time-before the unit has had an opportunity to complete its mission-the results to date indicate that it is indeed possible to form a new Army battalion in a deliberate manner using traditional methods of organization and training. There have been no major problems so far in this project, and none are expected.
The process is long and costly in terms of support required, but it appears likely that it will deliver a trained, fairly cohesive unit. 3 Specific observations are summarized as follows: 
It would have been possible to have formed and staffed a permanent battalion task
force within the AC, or entirely from the National Guard. The ARNG could have found all of the people to do this job, and the same thing is true of the AC. Either of these options would have been simpler administratively than mixing AC, ARNG, and USAR soldiers in the same unit. The USAR might have been able to do it by soliciting soldiers with infantry skills from the most recent additions to the IRR, but it would have been harder than for the other components.
Pretrained individuals from the IRR and the retired population can be used for these kinds of volunteer units. Although the current process emphasizes getting volunteers from
Dr. Phelps and Lieutenant Colonel Brumley point out, correctly, that it is premature to conclude that the process will result in a trained, cohesive, effective unit. However, the Army has been forming new units in this deliberate manner during and after World War II with a high degree of success, so there is no reason to suspect that it will fail merely because it mixes AC and RC soldiers. The recent enactment of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) requires the establishment by 1 October 1996 of a Reserve Active Status List (RASL) for National Guard and Reserve officers as the counterpart of the Active Duty List for active component officers. Officers on the RASL will be able to serve voluntarily or involuntarily on active duty without losing their identity or status as Reserve officers. National Guard units (plus a few from the IRR or USAR units), it would be feasible to obtain more or perhaps even all of the personnel for this kind of unit from the IRR. Using IRR personnel for volunteer units would not degrade the readiness of existing National Guard units. Retired military personnel should also be considered as a source of volunteers. Although, there are some objections to the use of retired personnel, they would be valuable for missions of a highly technical or special nature that would benefit by having soldiers with extensive prior service. 5 Obtaining volunteers for long tours has been more difficult than originally anticipated. It has been necessary for the National Guard to expand its recruiting base extensively to find 400 soldiers willing to come on active duty for a year to serve in the Sinai. While the initial reaction was encouraging, many of the early volunteers withdrew as the conditions and nature of the mission became known. The Army Reserve had difficulty in finding volunteers with low-density skills, such as linguists and behavioral science specialists. As OCAR points out, these special skills are in heavy demand in the civil sector and employers are reluctant to allow persons with these skills to be absent for extended periods [7] . These results indicate that broader pools from which to draw and more advanced planning-to include actions to encourage civilian employers to support volunteerism-are needed if future calls for individual long-term volunteers are to be met. These results also indicate that it could be difficult to attract long-term volunteers for several of these composite units at the same time.
The training program for the composite battalion is lengthy and intensive. It takes 11 months to form and train this battalion of 554 soldiers for a non-combat peacekeeping mission. The key leaders will be in dedicated mission training for 8 months, the entire leadership group (E-5 and above), for 6 months, and the entire battalion, for 3 months. 6 The entire leadership group was sent to a formal leadership training course for bonding and team building. Except for the leadership course, this process is quite similar to the program for an AC battalion, and the leadership training course is described by FORSCOM as a test. Nevertheless, the impression is that the training program may be more detailed and longer than necessary. During World War II, it took the Army 24 months to form and train entire Lieutenant Colonel Brumley observes that the assumption that retirees can be used for this kind of mission may be "flawed." He says, "Most retirees are over 45 years old, have been away from 'Army life' for a period of time, and may not have kept themselves in physical shape to meet Army standards. The harsh environment and demanding physical regimen may preclude successful participation of the retired community in future rotations" [8] . Lieutenant Colonel Brumley points out correctly that part of this time will be spent by the leaders in organizing and preparing to train the lower enlisted soldiers. However, for the leaders, these activities are also mission training [8] .
infantry divisions of 16,000 soldiers for combat-presumably a more demanding mission than peacekeeping. 7 The program appears to have been designed to retrain everyone from scratch to do this mission, ignoring the current training status and professionalism of members of the ARNG and USAR. 8 By way of comparison, the average time from activation to deployment for 14 all-draftee infantry divisions formed in 1942 was 24 months. According to Reference [10] , the shortest time to create a new division was 16 months for the 88th Infantry Division and the longest time was 29 months for the 89th Infantry Division. The process was complicated and extended by having the new divisions furnish cadres for still more divisions. 8 Lieutenant Colonel Brumley says that the content of this observation relating to the training schedule is speculative and not based on "reasonable research." He asserts that the training program is a training strategy and is not based on other considerations [8] . 9 This is not to say that planning cannot be done in advance for certain scenarios. The U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency has developed two models for estimating requirements for certain kinds of operations other than war. There are many ways to meet these requirements other than forming a new, deliberate volunteer unit. The National Guard Bureau has made a "pragmatic forecast of the types of units required in a natural emergency" by selecting units for participation in Project Standard Bearer. However, response to natural disasters requires urgent action for which deliberate formation of a new unit is inappropriate.
strength for FY94. The Army has also had to use 133 of its own AC soldiers for the mission. If the major purpose were to maintain the readiness of light divisions, the Army could have formed a new battalion specifically for the MFO-Sinai mission and sustained it with individual replacements at about the same total cost. The Army has in effect brought 456 more trained soldiers into its ranks for a year by "transferring" them from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, but appears to have given only minimal credit for the previous training and experience of the RC soldiers. The short-term advantages to the Army could be increased by giving more credit for the training and experience of the Reserve soldiers, and the burden on the Active Army could be decreased by assigning the entire mission to the National Guard.
There may be long-term advantages to the Total Army from this initiative. The National Guard, particularly, will benefit by having these soldiers return to its ranks after a year of intensive training to Active Army standards and operational experience in the Sinai. More important could be the intangible benefits from the intimate integration of active and reserve soldiers. As the soldiers of each component work together, each group may come to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups and, perhaps, learn to work together harmoniously with mutual respect. This could allow the Army to progress toward a better realization of the Total Army than has been achieved up to now.
